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Disarmament and Civilian Control in Japan: 
A Constitutional Dilemma* 
Theodore McNelly 
Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, USA 
I. Introduction 
The only national constitution in the world that 
renounces both war and arms is that of Japan. 
Artie le 9 of that country's 1946 basic law 
provides: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever re-
nounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling interna-
tional disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
Nevertheless, by 1980, Japan, whose Con-
stitution had once seemed to forbid forever the 
maintenance of any military forces whatsoever, 
had the world's ninth most expensive defense 
establishment. 1 The political opposition in Ja-
pan has been very fearful of a revival of 
militarism in Japan and has sought to block or 
at least to contain any form of armament. At 
the same time, the opposition has resisted 
proposals for establishing organs for civilian 
control over the military because of the fear 
• I am grateful to the Fulbright Commission and the 
General Research Board of the University of Mary-
land for funding that facilitated this research. I am 
much indebted to Professors Sato !sao and Nishi 
Osamu for their suggestions. This paper was pre-
sented at the Twelfth World Congress of the Inter-
national Political Science Association, Rio de 
Janeiro, August 9-14, 1982, in a panel organized by 
the IPSA Research Committee on Comparative Judi-
cial Studies. 
that such organs would legitimize the 'uncon-
stitutional' military forces. The hope of 
abolishing the Self-Defense Forces by means 
of legislation and court appeals has thus inhi-
bited the opposition from agreeing to the or-
ganization of civilian control agencies. How 
did this dilemma arise in the first place, and 
how has the Japanese political system managed 
to cope with it? 
2. The origins of the dilemma 
At the end of World War II, the two funda-
mental aims of the Allied Occupation of Japan 
were to ensure that Japan would never again 
become a threat to the Allies and that Japan be 
converted into a democracy. 2 The State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), an 
interdepartmental body, formulated the specific 
United States policies which, with the concur-
rence of America's Allies, were to be enforced 
by the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP), Douglas MacArthur. 
SWNCC-228, 'Reform of the Japanese Gov-
ernmental System', detailed the evils of dual 
government in prewar Japan, in which the 
military branch exercised authority at least 
equal with, and often superior to, that of the 
civilian branch. A basic purpose of Japan's 
constitutional reform, in Washington's view, 
was to ensure civilian control over the military. 
To accomplish this, according to SWNCC, 
there should be a provision in the constitution 
that all ministers of state be civilians, thus 
preventing the army and navy from controlling 
(l) 
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the m1msters of the Army and Navy Depart-
ments. Also, the Emperor's prerogative to 
command the military, which had been used by 
the military to evade control by the prime 
minister and cabinet, would have to be 
abolished.3 (Articles XI and XII of the Im-
perial Constitution [1889]. the Emperor's 
military command prerogatives, had been con-
strued to mean that on military matters the 
Emperor was advised, not by the prime minis-
ter, but directly by the high command and the 
ministers of the army and navy. This system of 
the 'high command's access to the emperor' 
[iaku joso] made it difficult or impossible for 
the cabinet and the Diet to control the military. 
The army and navy ministers were required by 
an imperial ordinance to be high ranking gen-
erals or admirals, and when the policies or 
personnel of a cabinet or even of a proposed 
cabinet were unsatisfactory to the army or the 
navy, that branch of the service would not 
permit one of its officers to be a cabinet 
minister. The effect of this system sometimes 
seemed to give the military services the power 
of life or death over cabinets.)4 
In February 1946, the reluctance of the 
Shidehara cabinet to come forward with a 
clearly democratic draft constitution stimulated 
MacArthur to direct his Government Section to 
prepare a model constitution as a basis for 
Japanese efforts. MacArthur stipulated that, 
among other things, the constitution should ban 
war 'even for preserving its own security' and 
the maintenance of military forces. The Ameri-
can drafters of the constitution, however, re-
garded the phrase 'even for preserving its own 
security' as 'unrealistic', and left it out of the 
constitutional ban on war and arms. Thus, at a 
very early stage of the formulation of the 
Japanese Constitution, MacArthur's original 
pacifistic language was toned down by his own 
staff. 
The no-war, no-arms clause, MacArthur 
said in 1951, had been suggested to him by 
Prime Minister Shidehara, but many scholars 
doubt that Shidehara originally advocated to 
MacArthur that Japan renounce unilaterally in 
its constitution the maintenance of armed 
forces. Irrespective of who originally suggested 
Article 9, it seems clear that such a revolution-
ary provision would never have been adopted 
without MacArthur's strong insistence. 5 
Following the publication of the SCAP-
inspired draft by the Shidehara Cabinet as its 
own proposal, the Far Eastern Commission 
(the inter-Allied agency which made policy for 
the Occupation of Japan) adopted a policy on 
constitutional reform.• Like SWNCC-228, the 
Allied policy did not call for a constitutional 
ban on war and arms - indeed no mention 
whatsoever was made of military forces - but 
rather required that the constitution provide 
that all cabinet ministers be civilians. MacAr-
thur's staff checked the FEC guidelines against 
their draft constitution and found that, although 
the latter did not provide for civilian ministers, 
such a provision would be unnecessary as Ja-
pan, which had been disarmed by the Allies, 
would have no military forces. 7 On August 19, 
1946, MacArthur asked Prime Minister 
Yoshida to see to three modifications, includ-
ing a civilian minister's provision, in the draft 
constitution to make it agree with FEC policy. 
The Japanese objected to the requirement that 
ministers be civilians, holding that it was un-
suitable because there would be no military in 
Japan in the future as a result !Jf Article 9. 
MacArthur agreed not to require the insertion 
of the civilian-ministers provision. 
3. The Ashida amendments 
While the draft constitution was under consid-
eration in the House of Representatives, 
Ashida Hitoshi, then chairman of the lower 
house special committee on the constitution, 
proposed and obtained the adoption of some 
significant changes in the text of the no-war 
clause. As a result of the A~hida amendments, 
it appear~ to some people that paragraph I of 
Article 9 does not renounce all kinds of war, 
only war and the threat or use of force as means 
of settling international disputes. Thus war and 
the threat or use of force as means of self-
defense might be permissible. The phrase at the 
beginning of paragraph 2, 'in order to ac-
complish the aim of the preceding paragraph', 
might be interpreted as qualifying the renun-
ciation of land, sea, and air forces. Thus, 
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although annaments for settling international 
disputes are banned, annaments for other pur-
poses, such as self-defense, are not renounced. 
When Ashida brought his amendments to 
Charles L. Kades, the deputy chief of Gov-
ernment Section, Kades made no objection. 
Dr. Cyrus Peake, an officer in Government 
Section, pointed out to General Courtney 
Whitney, the section's chief, that the Ashida 
amendment might mean that Japan could 
maintain defense forces, but Whitney saw noth-
ing wrong in that. The Government Section's 
concurrence with the Ashida amendments was 
consistent with its earlier attitude that defense 
need not be expressly forbidden in the con-
stitution. The amendments to Article 9 were 
passed by the House of Representatives. 
The Chinese delegate to the Far Eastern 
Commission was outraged by the Ashida 
amendments. He asserted on September 21 that 
Article 9 as now altered was a trick by 
Japanese militarists to deceive the world into 
thinking that Japan was absolutely renouncing 
military forces when actually they were plan-
ning to reann the country making use of the 
loop-hole created by the recent textual changes 
in the draft constitution.8 On September 25, 
the FEC adopted a policy statement reiterating, 
among other things, its demand that all cabinet 
ministers be civilians. 
By this time, the constitution revision bill 
was being debated in the House of Peers. In 
response to the repeated insistence of the Far 
Eastern Commission, MacArthur's staff per-
suaded key members of the House of Peers to 
insert a provision in the proposed constitution 
providing that all ministers of state be 
civilians. 
The relevant committee members of the 
House of Peers complied with the SCAP re-
quest although they were very confused about 
its purpose. As there was no single Japanese 
word corresponding exactly with the English 
word civilian (meaning no more and no less), 
the committee, after long discussion, coined a 
neologism, bunmin, by combining the Chinese 
characters for literature and person. 9 The draft 
constitution including the amended Article 9 
was approved by both houses of the Imperial 
Diet and the Privy Council and was promul-
gated by the Emperor on November 3, 1946. 
The provision that cabinet members should 
be civilian obviously implied the existence in 
some form or other of non-civilians. Many 
Diet members and scholars assumed that the 
purpose of the civilian-ministers clause was to 
prevent the former officers of Japan's prewar 
anny and navy from becoming cabinet mem-
bers. The Imperial Army and Navy had been 
abolished by Allied fiat - Japan was now 
completely disanned - and the some 200,000 
anny and navy officers had been 'purged' (for-
bidden from holding public office). Presuma-
bly the civilian-ministers provision in the con-
stitution would perpetuate the purge of these 
military people. In light of the constitutional 
ban on the maintenance of military forces, 
however, the civilian-ministers clause seemed 
inappropriate for inclusion in the constitution, 
a presumably permanent document that would 
be in effect long after the former imperial anny 
and navy officers were no longer alive. It did, 
however, occur to a few, not many, of the 
Japanese and Americans involved in drafting 
the constitution that the civilian-ministers 
clause, so insisted upon by the Allied Powers, 
was deliberately intended to anticipate the pos-
sibiliry that Japan in the future would again 
have a military establishment. (Some observers 
have therefore concluded that the civilian-
ministers clause recognized the constitution-
a/icy of military forces by providing for civilian 
control over them. Such indeed has been the 
view of Professor Ohira Zengo.)1° 
4. Ambiguities in Article 9 
The official Japanese text of Article 9 makes it 
clear that 'as means of settling international 
disputes' applies to 'war' as well as to 'the 
threat or use of force'. I suggest the following 
translation in lieu of the official English ver-
sion as a more accurate rendition of paragraph 
I of the Japanese text: 
The Japanese people, aspiring sincerely to an inter-
national peace based on justice and order, renounce 
forever, as means of settling international disputes, 
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat 
or use of force. 
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Sato Tatsuo states that some Japanese scholars 
cite the official English translation in support 
of the view that paragraph I of Article 9 bans 
all wars including defensive wars. This, he 
says, is a misinterpretation that was not antici-
pated by those charged with preparing the offi-
cial English version. 11 Although in the first 
sentence of paragraph 2, the official English 
version states 'will never be maintained', the 
Japanese text seems weaker: 'hoji shinai' (are 
not, or will not, be maintained). The expres-
sion 'eikyii ni" (in perpetuity) was removed by 
the House of Representatives committee appar-
ently to permit Japanese participation in a 
United Nations force at some future time. 12 
What is the significance of the legislative 
history for the interpretation of Article 9? It 
appears that from the beginning to the end of 
the drafting and passage of the Constitution 
there was a tendency in public statements of 
the American and Japanese officials concerned 
to imply or state outright that the ban on 
armaments was absolute and that armaments 
even for defense were banned. At the same 
time, there existed among the most informed 
Japanese and Allied officials an awareness that 
defensive arms might be permissible under Ar-
ticle 9. If SCAP and Japanese Government 
offi~ials and Diet members had been absolutely 
determined to eliminate the possibility that 
arms for defense might be permitted, they 
could have added the phrase 'even for the 
purpose of defense', but they did not. Indeed, 
they did just the opposite. The deletion of 'even 
for preserving its own security' by MacAr-
thur's Headquarters, and the Ashida and 
civilian-ministers amendments in the Diet, 
opened the door for defensive armament. 
Such ambiguity, as deplorable as it may 
seem to either the opponents or the advocates 
of defensive armament, is not at all uncommon 
in statutes, constitutions, and treaties. The 
politicians and statesmen who draft these 
documents are frequently quite aware of such 
ambiguities and deliberately tolerate or create 
them for practical purposes. 
Some Japanese scholars assert that paragraph 
I bans defensive as well as offensive wars. 
Some assert that while paragraph I does not 
explicitly ban defensive war, paragraph 2 bans 
all armaments, including defensive armament, 
making it impossible to fight a war of defense. 
Some scholars assert that just as paragraph I 
does not forbid defensive war, paragraph 2 
does not forbid defensive armament. Other 
authorities condemn the interpretation that Ar-
ticle 9 permits defensive war and arms because 
there is no sure way to distinguish between 
defense and aggression or between defensive 
and offensive weapons. Since aggression is 
nearly always justified as defense, they say, 
the 'hawkish' interpretation of Article 9 in 
essence deprives this most important provision 
of Constitution of any real meaning. 13 
The 'right of belligerency' that is renounced 
is also the subject of debate. Some writers say 
that this means the right of the state to go to 
war. Others assert that this refers to the rights 
that a belligerent enjoys under international law 
in time of war. 14 
5. The constitutionality of the self-
defense forces 
In 1950, following the Chinese Communist 
victory on the Asian mainland and the outbreak 
of the Korean war, MacArthur ordered the 
creation of the National Police Reserve in Ja-
pan. Within four years this became the Self-
Defense Forces (SDF). 
There have been three principal views about 
the significance of Article 9 for the Self-De-
fense Forces: (I) Any military forces, what-
soever, including defense forces, are uncon-
stitutional. (2) Forces for exclusively defensive 
purposes are constitutional. (3) Defensive 
forces are not unconstitutional, but to clarify 
their legality (for purposes of improving troop 
indoctrination and mobilizing public support 
for defense), the Constitution ought to be 
amended. 15 The fact that constitutional 
amendment requires a two-thirds majority in 
both houses of the Diet and a majority of the 
vote in a referendum has made it impossible 
for the governing conservative party to amend 
the Constitution in the face of public support 
for Article 9. The government has therefore 
tended to interpret the Constitution loosely and 
has largely given up its efforts to amend it. 
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In the early 1950's the Japanese government 
took the position that the Constitution did not 
forbid 'armed forces without war potential'. 
(War potential meant 'forces which can effec-
tively carry out contemporary warfare' ) When 
the SDF were established in 1954, the govern-
ment held that 'such minimum forces as are 
absolutely necessary for self-defense may be 
constitutionally maintained' .16 
Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution con-
fers on the courts the authority to review the 
constitutionality of legislation. The ambiguities 
of Article 9 and the bitterness of the ongoing 
debate over the moral, economic, and strategic 
desirability of the SDF have resulted in re-
peated efforts to challenge the constitutionality 
of the Forces. In 1959, the Tokyo District 
Court in the Sunakawa case declared uncon-
stitutional the 1951 U.S. - Japan Security 
Treaty, under which American forces were 
stationed in Japan. The Supreme Court over-
ruled the lower court on the grounds that the 
case fell 'outside the right of judicial review by 
the courts, unless there is clearly obvious un-
constitutionality or invalidity.' 17 The Supreme 
Court further found that the Constitution did 
not forbid Japan from requesting a guarantee of 
her security from another country nor did the 
Constitution forbid the stationing of foreign 
military forces in Japan. The Court did not 
pass judgement on the constitutionality of Ja-
pan's own SDF. 
In the Eniwa case in 1967, the Sapporo 
District Court avoided having to rule on the 
constitutionality of the SDF Law by finding the 
defendants innocent. It was not until 1973, 
twenty-seven years after the enactment of the 
new Constitution, that a court ruled directly on 
the constitutionality of the SDF. In the 
Naganuma case, the Sapporo District Court 
explicitly denied the doctrine of the 'political 
question' cited by the government to avert the 
review of the constitutionality of the legislation 
in question. Instead, the court flatly declared 
unconstitutional the Self-Defense Forces Law 
and the Defense Agency Establishment Law. 
In his decision, Judge Fukushima Shigeo found 
that Article 9 bans all armament, including 
defensive weapons, and denies even the right 
of belligerency. In view of their scale, equip-
ment, and capability, he declared, Ground, 
Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces are 
land, sea, and air forces as mentioned in Arti-
cle 9 and are therefore unconstitutional. 18 
The government appealed the case to the 
Sapporo High Court, which issued its decision 
nearly three years later, on August 5, 1976. 
Judge Ogo Yosoji overruled the decision of the 
District Court because the original plaintiffs in 
the case had no legal standing to sue. Their 
complaint had been that the establishment of an 
Air SDF missile base had deprived them of 
water supply and flood protection afforded by 
the forest preserve in which the base was built. 
However, the High Court found that the con-
struction of suitable dams, etc. assured 
adequate water supply and flood protection and 
no one's rights had been harmed. Thus the case 
was settled without inquiring into the constitu-
tionality of the SDF as the District Court had 
done. 19 Having overruled the district court 
decision that the SDF is unconstitutional, the 
Sapporo High Court has now left us without a 
legal ruling on the constitutionality of the De-
fense Forces. 
6. Justiciability 
The Sapporo High Court's decision included an 
obiter dictum that advocated the theory of the 
'political question' (which limited the scope of 
judicial review) and pointed out the existence 
of opinions supporting as well as opposing the 
constitutionality of the SDF. 
Although the obiter dictum has no legal 
force, it of course attracted wide attention and 
gave respectability to the views of the govern-
ment and conservatives concerning the scope 
of judicial review and the constitutionality of 
the SDF. The Ogo opinion could possibly 
serve at a later date as a basis for decisions 
made by other courts, including ·the Supreme 
Court. The opinion, eloquently stated in 
Japanese, may be summarized as follows: The 
Japanese government consists of three 
branches, executive, legislative, and judicial. 
The first two branches (political branches) 
make policy, the judicial branch (courts) 
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applies laws to cases brought before it and 
cannot itself initiate policy. How Japan is to be 
defended is a matter that requires technical 
acquaintance with diplomacy, strategy, and 
military technology and involves the political 
responsibility of the government and of the 
Diet. Unless the laws creating the SDF and the 
Defense Agency are obviously at first sight 
unconstitutional, it is beyond the scope of the 
authority of the courts to review their constitu-
tionality. There are two principal views con-
cerning the constitutionality of the SDF. One 
holds that Article 9 does not permit armaments 
even for self-defense. The other view holds 
that defensive armaments are not forbidden by 
Article 9. Since it is not immediately and 
obviously clear that the SDF are unconstitu-
tional, this is a matter outside the scope of 
judicial review. It is not the business of the 
courts to make defense policy but that of the 
cabinet and the Diet, and ultimately of the 
sovereign voters, to whom these organs are 
responsible. 
The Ogo opinion reflected strongly the prin-
ciples enunciated by the Supreme Court in the 
Tomabechi case (1960) outlining practical 
limits to the judicial authority, and the 
Sunakawa case (1959), concerning the doctrine 
of political questions, especially as regards the 
interpretation of Article 9. However, Ogo in 
effect carried the political question doctrine 
farther than the Supreme Court had done in 
1959. In the Sunakawa Case, the Supreme 
Court had ruled that the U.S.-Japan Pact, a 
treaty with status in international law, was a 
political question, whereas Ogo applied the 
doctrine of the political question to two 
domestic laws. The Naganuma case concerned 
the constitutionality of Japan's own forces. 
Some opponents of the SDF feared that the 
Ogo opinion might encourage conservatively 
inclined courts to go beyond merely refusing to 
judge the constitutionality of the SDF. The 
courts might actually adopt the government's 
argument, already made respectable in the Ogo 
opinion, that the SDF are constitutional. Thus 
the political question, used to avoid ruling on 
the SDF, might be dropped by conservative 
judges in favor of a positive decision that the 
laws creating the SDF and Defense Agency are 
constitutional. 20 
Indeed, in 1977, the Mito District Court 
ruled, in connection with the Hyakuri Air Base 
controversy, that Article 9 did not go so far as 
to forbid wars of defense and defensive milit-
ary forces. The court also found that the matter 
of whether or not the present Self-Defense 
Forces were offensive forces exceeding the 
limits required for defense was a political 
question outside the scope of judicial review. 
In 1980, Professor Hashimoto Kiminobu, of 
Chuo University, published his theory of con-
stitutional change. His idea is that as a result of 
the policies of the cabinet, the enactment by 
the Diet of laws creating the Self-Defense 
Forces and Defense Agency, judicial decisions, 
and popular perceptions, Article 9 now has a 
different meaning from what it formerly had. 
For this reason, the SDF, which Hashimoto 
had formerly believed were unconstitutional, 
are now constitutional. Mainstream constitu-
tional law professors in Japan expressed keen 
concern that Hashimoto's theory would influ-
ence young law students and strengthen the 
already strong possibility that the Supreme 
Court would ultimately find the SDF constitu-
tional (or at least not unconstitutiona1). 21 
The Naganuma case was appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which has not yet made a 
decision. There is speculation that the Supreme 
Court is reluctant to act because of the ongoing 
controversy about urgent American requests 
that Japan make a greater contribution to the 
common defense of the Free World. 
Many informed observers believe that even 
in cases not involving Article 9, the Supreme 
Court for a number of years has deliberately 
construed its power of judicial review narrowly 
in order to avoid having to exercise such au-
thority in connection with Article 9. 22 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court did not declare any statute 
unconstitutional during the first 26 years of its 
existence. 23 Beginning in 1973, it has declared 
several laws unconstitutional. Of course, even 
if the court did rule on the constitutionality of 
the SDF, it could cite the Ashida amendment 
as grounds for declaring that law constitu-
tional. 
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Many Japanese have been concerned that the 
existence of the SDF in evident violation of the 
most notable provision of the Constitution 
could 'reduce public confidence in and respect 
for other constitutional provisions and guaran-
tees and hence the constitutional system it-
self. ' 24 
It should be noted that there is a substantial 
difference between the views of legal experts 
and of the general public on the constitution-
ality and desirability of maintaining the SDF. 
A poll taken in 1981 by the Asahi Shinbun (a 
leading Tokyo newspaper) showed that 61 per-
cent of the public favored preserving the SDF 
at present levels and 22 percent favored 
strengthening the SDF. By contrast a poll ad-
ministered by the Horitsu jiho (a leading law 
journal) at about the same time showed that 45 
percent of legal scholars favored abolishing the 
SDF and 15 percent favored reducing it. Thus 
83 percent of the public favored preserving or 
increasing the SDF while 60 percent of legal 
experts favored abolition or reduction of the 
forces. The two polls also showed that while 
17 percent of the public felt that the SDF were 
unconstitutional, 4 7 percent felt that they were 
not unconstitutional. By contrast, 71 percent of 
the legal experts believed that the forces were 
unconstitutional and only 27 percent found 
they were not unconstitutional. 25 
Any realistic political analysis must take into 
account the facts of public support of the SDF 
and of its constitutional legitimacy not-
withstanding the views of legal specialists. 
The scholars' views on the Constitution and 
defense seem to have changed very little over 
the past three decades while those of the public 
have changed very considerably. In face of the 
growing visibility of the constitution-revision 
movement headed by conservative former 
prime minister Kishi Nobusuke, legal scholars, 
pacifists, and progressives feel a sense of 
crisis. They wonder how they can 'defend the 
Peace Constitution' and prevent the revival of 
militarism and fascism now that public opinion 
is no longer supportive of their positions. (In 
Japan, 'defense of the Constitution' is the 
slogan used by progressives to prevent the 
amendment of the document. Most legal ex-
perts believe that Article 9, in which Japan 
forever renounces war and arms, may not be 
legally amended, or at the very least the 
pacific principle may not legally be expunged.) 
Given the relative unpopularity of 'unarmed 
neutrality' among the Japanese voters today, 
this issue is not consistently and emphatically 
supported among any of the political parties 
except the Japan Socialists, and even they, in 
an effort to recruit coalition partners, have 
been softening their traditional stand. If the 
Supreme Court were to declare unconstitutional 
the law creating the SDF, it could provoke a 
confrontation with a government enjoying sub-
stantial electoral support. In such a situation, 
the government might feel obliged to sponsor 
the amendment of Article 9 in order to 
legitimize the SDF. Constitutional amendments 
require a two-thirds vote of all members of 
each house plus the approval of the majority of 
the voters in a national referendum. As Article 
9 is supported by the overwhelming majority of 
the people (including many supporters of the 
SDF), the national debate over the constitu-
tional amendment would be extremely divisive 
and, according to some observers, would in all 
likelihood result in resorts to violence. Such 
practical considerations no doubt have fostered 
the reluctance of the courts to rule on the 
constitutionality of the SDF and to take refuge 
in the doctrine of 'political questions'. 
7. The opposition to rearmament 
It must be said that Article 9 was from the very 
beginning the most popular provision in Ja-
pan's postwar constitution. During World War 
II, not only were the Japanese Army and Navy 
defeated, but the civilian population suffered 
heavily from massive air attacks on Japanese 
cities, including the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The revival of 
militarism is widely feared, not only because 
of the possible involvement of Japan in another 
war but also because of the possible revival of 
oppressive, fascist government and distortions 
in the economy which militarism would cause. 
The Japan Socialist Party charges that the 
SDF, even if vastly strengthened, would be 
incapable of defending Japan. Japan's cities 
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cannot be defended from aerial and naval at-
tack, as was shown in World War II. Instead, 
the opposition believes, the real function of the 
SDF is to help the U.S. military in the Far East 
cany out the Pentagon's global strategy for the 
enhancement of American interests. Japan's 
rearmament, they charge, is provocative to-
wards Japan's neighbors and carries the strong 
risk of converting the Japanese archipelago into 
a battleground for a war between the super-
powers - a war in which Japan has no interest. 
A further danger alleged by the opposition is 
that the SDF might be mobilized to suppress 
the Japanese people. If a neutralist government 
was elected, for example, the SDF might cany 
out a coup d'etat to install a regime friendly to 
it. 
Socialists assert that the SDF and security 
treaty with the United States exist in violation 
of the Constitution, which, they say, clearly 
provides that Japan cannot maintain military 
forces (including defense forces)· and cannot 
enter into collective defense arrangements with 
other countries. The only practical and only 
legal defense policy for Japan, they say, is un-
armed neutrality. Japan's security can be en-
sured by nonmilitary means, including peace 
diplomacy and economic and cultural coopera-
tion with other countries. It is almost unthinka-
ble to them that, given Japan's peaceful orien-
tation and geographic location, any other 
country would attack Japan, especially if its 
independence were guaranteed by a multilateral 
treaty signed by the United States, the Soviet 
Union, China, and Japan. 26 (The alleged 
threat of international communism and the 
Soviet Union were used by the militarists as 
pretexts for Japan's invasion of China in the 
1930's with disastrous results. The Socialists 
say that the Japanese people should tum a deaf 
ear to the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist 
propaganda emanating from the Pentagon and 
Japanese reactionaries who apparently want Ja-
pan to repeat the disastrous mistakes of the 
1930's.) Recently Japanese opponents of rearm-
ament have been citing America's commitment 
to defend Japan under the U .S.-Japan security 
treaty as a deterrent to invasion, making un-
necessary a Japanese military build-up. It 
might, however, be said that the policy of 
unarmed neutrality is pursued by no important 
country in the world and is difficult for most 
foreign observers to understand. 27 
In the late 1950's and early 1960's Japan 
appeared to have a two-party system. The Ja-
pan Socialists looked forward to taking over 
the government in the early or late 1960's, and 
then they would be able to terminate the sec-
urity treaty with the United States and abolish 
the Self-Defense Forces. The policy of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) to revise the 
Constitution to legitimize the Self-Defense 
Force was unpopular, and the Japan Socialists 
found this issue more effective than economic 
or ideological issues to capture votes. Although 
the Liberal Democrats lost ground in the 
1960's in terms of popular votes and Diet 
seats, the Japan Socialists were unable to ben-
efit from the Liberal Democratic decline 
partly because of the rise of the third parties: 
the democratic Socialist, the Komeito, and 
the Communist. The failure of the Japan 
Socialists to capture widespread support out-
side of the Sohyo-affiliated labour unions has 
. resulted in the continuance in power of the 
conservative, pro-American governments that 
have progressively increased military spending 
and supported the alignment with America. 
While the public has been unenthusiastic about 
the LOP's security policies, thus far these 
policies have not been sufficiently unpopular to 
enable the Japan Socialists to capture a 
majority in the Diet or to set up a Socialist-led 
coalition government. 
8. Civilian control in Japan today 
Since World War II, probably the most drama-
tic demonstration of civilian control for 
Japanese as well as Americans was the dismi3-
sal of General Douglas MacArthur in 1951 as 
commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, Su-
preme Commander for the Allied Powers, and 
Commander in Chief of the Far East Com-
mand. 28 MacArthur had been the absolute 
ruler of Japan for nearly five years and his role 
in the enactment of Japan's 'Peace Constitu-
tion' had been crucial. Some Western com-
mentators hailed the firing of MacArthur as a 
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fine object lesson for the militaristic Japanese 
on the meaning of civilian control. Both before 
and after his dismissal, MacArthur advocated 
that all nations renounce war and arms in their 
constitutions as Japan had done. 29 Samuel P. 
Huntington, a leading authority on civil-milit-
ary relations, has hailed MacArthur as 'the 
nation's most eloquent advocate of the aboli-
tion of war.'30 In 1951, however, President 
Truman and much of the American public 
seem to have been less impressed with 
MacArthur's pacifist rhetoric than with his 
public advocacy of enlarging the Korean war. 
The literature on civilian control has prolif-
erated greatly in Japan during the past five 
years, and articles on the topic have been 
written by constitutional experts on both sides 
of the rearmament issue. This literature, almost 
exclusively in Japanese, is virtually unknown 
outside of Japan. The Japanese often use the 
English expression civilian control ( shibirian 
konrororu) instead of the Japanese equivalent 
bunmin tosei, seeming to imply that the sub-
ject is one of concern to other democratic 
countries besides Japan. 'Civil-military rela-
tions', a topic favored by American analysts, is 
of less concern to the Japanese, whose histori-
cal experience with militaristic excess has not 
disposed them to emphasize the rights and 
authority of the military. 
The Constitution stipulates that all ministers 
of state be civilians, so that both the prime 
minister, who has supreme command of the 
SDF, and the minister of state serving as di-
rector general of the Defense Agency are both 
civilians. Officers in the Self-Defense Forces 
are not considered to be civilians under the 
government's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. The prime minister of Japan is selected by 
the two houses of the Japanese Diet. Within 
the Defense Agency, civilian officials control 
the SDF. The Diet exercises the power to make 
laws concerning defense matters, including the 
appropriation of funds. The Diet passes on 
treaties. 
According to the law establishing the SDF 
(1954), when the prime minister mobilizes the 
SDF, the Diet must give its approval either 
before or after the fact. (The Constitution 
makes no provision for the declaration of war.) 
In matters of defense policy and the mohiliza-
tion of the SDF, the prime minister is advised 
by the National Defense Council, which con-
sists of the prime minister (chairman), the de-
puty prime minister, the director of the De-
fense Agency, the foreign minister, the finance 
minister, and the director of the Economic 
Planning Agency. Assisting the civilian direc-
tor general of the Defense Agency are a par-
liamentary vice minister and an administrative 
vice minister (both civilians) and ten civilian 
councillors, who fill the posts of director gen-
erals of the secretariat and other internal 
bureaus.31 
Because the prime minister is a civilian re-
sponsible to the Diet, which is elected by the 
people, the commander of the SDF is ulti-
mately responsible to the people of Japan. 
Thus, the conservatives claim, civilian control 
and democratic processes are assured. 
The National Defense Council meets so sel-
dom that there are real questions as to its 
usefulness as an organ of civilian control. It 
met only fifty times in the twenty-five years 
from 1946 to 1981 - on the average twice a 
year. There have been seven years in which it 
met only once during the year and seven years 
when it did not meet at all, even when urgent 
international crises would seem to require 
meetings. Most of the members seem not 
greatly interested in strategic questions and 
largely confine their discussions to the scale of 
military build-up and the defense budget. 32 
From a pacifist point of view, this system of 
civilian control in Japan is very unsatisfactory. 
In addition to legitimizing the SDF, it gives the 
cabinet control over the armed forces. Since 
1948, the cabinet has been consistently conser-
vative and since 1952 it has been favorably 
disposed to rearmament. The conservatives, 
many of whom favor the repeal or radical 
amendment of Article 9, cannot, it is said, be 
trusted to keep the military in check. Until 
1980 there was no standing committee on na-
tional defense in either house of the Diet. The 
Socialists and other opposition parties opposed 
the creation of such a committee for fear that it 
would further serve to legitimize the SDF. 
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The question has arisen about what the SDF 
should or would do at the moment that it was 
attacked without forewarning by a foreign 
military force. Would it have to await the 
decision of the prime minister before it could 
fight back in self-defense? In 1978, Kurisu 
Kiroomi, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, 
said that in such a situation, 'It is possible that 
the frontline commanders would first take 
supralegal action on their own.' 33 The 
suggestion of such action, which would at least 
temporarily release the SDF of governmental 
control, provoked a fury in the Diet, and 
Kurisu was forced to resign. In the meantime, 
the government has been considering 
'emergency legislation' that would provide for 
the contingencies of the sort envisaged by 
Kurisu. Needless to say, these legislative prop-
. osals have been the target of strong criticism 
by socialists, pacifists, and constitutional 
lawyers. 
9. The meaning of civilian control 
Even though it may be possible to agree on 
civilian control as a matter of principle, there 
are bound to be basic differences of view 
concerning (I) the purposes and definition of 
civilian control and (2) the forms of civilian 
control. Everyone of course agrees that civilian 
control must conform to constitutional re-
quirements. At the same time, it would seem 
almost inevitable that the opponents of rear-
mament see civilian control as a means to 
eliminate or reduce so far as possible the milit-
ary establishment when appeals to the courts to 
abolish the SDF have proven successful and 
are likely to be unsuccessful in the future. 
Pacitists regard the constitutional abolition of 
defensive as well as offensive military forces 
as civilian control par excellence. Pacifists 
would define civilian control to include the 
democratization of the military to the point that 
morale and discipline are destroyed and the 
military rendered useless as a fighting force. 
The 'human rights' of soldiers to bargain col-
lectively, trial by civilian courts, etc., have 
been asserted as essential elements of civilian 
control. Article 76 of the Constitution is said to 
prohibit court martials. Proposed laws con-
cerning the 'right to know' might deprive the 
military of the ability to keep secrets and to 
make or carry out plans. The people's 'right to 
live in peace', mentioned in the preamble of 
the Constitution, may be cited in the Diet or the 
courts to prohibit gunnery practice, the practice 
of military maneuvers, or the acquisition of 
land for military purposes. It has been prop-
osed that in an organ of the Diet exercising 
oversight over the military, the minority parties 
be given a power of veto, thus enabling the 
Communists or Socialists to frustrate the will 
of the majority in defense matters. The forms 
of civilian control favored by conservatives and 
the forms favored by progressives and pacifists 
thus vary considerably. The problem is: 'Which 
civilians are to do the controlling?'34 The 
present structure of the Defense Agency, it is 
charged, provides for bureaucratic control, 
rather than civilian control. 35 
The government interprets the Constitution 
to mean that the 'war potential' banned by the 
Constitution does not include the minimum ar-
mament necessary for Japan's self-defense. 
Thus Japan may arm defensively, but mini-
mally. Japan, therefore, may not have offen-
sive weapons and may not dispatch armed 
personnel to engage in military action abroad. 
Nuclear weapons for defense are not prohibited 
by Article 9 according to the government. 
However, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, ratified by Japan in 1976, prohibits 
Japan from possessing nuclear weapons. Ja-
pan's policy of the 'three nuclear principles' 
means that there will be 'no possession, no 
manufacture, and no introduction of nuclear 
weapons in Japan'. The U.S.-Japan treaty 
clearly does not commit Japan to defend 
America but does commit America to defend 
Japan. (The view of the government is that the 
Constitution prohibits Japan from entering into 
collective defense agreements.) 
It is the prevailing view both in and out for 
the government in Japan that conscription is 
not permissible under the Constitution, which 
forbids involuntary servirude, except as 
punishment of crime (Article 18). Japan's 
postwar Constitution is very different from 
West Germany's Basic Law, also written under 
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AUied tutelage. In West Germany, armament is 
not constitutionally banned, and conscription 
has been instituted. 
10. Recognizing the reality 
By 1980, it appeared that, notwithstanding 
constitutional provisions as interpreted by 
socialists and the majority of constitutional 
lawyers, the SDF was here to stay. The SDF, 
which had been created in 1954, and its pre-
decessors, the National Police Reserve and the 
Security Forces, had been in existence for 
nearly thirty years. The courts were not defini-
tively ruling the SDF unconstitutional; the op-
position parties were not sufficiently strong or 
united to throw out the pro-SDF governing 
party, and public opinion polls showed an 
increasing public acceptance of the SDF, so 
that only a small minority of the people advo-
cated their outright abolition. As the possibility 
of either litigating or legislating the SDF out of 
existence seemed increasingly remote, it was 
becoming urgent to establish more effective 
control over SDF. Although the pacifists 
and socialists were not ready to give up the 
struggle to abolish the SDF, they were more 
open minded than previously to the idea of 
setting up instrumentalities for civilian control. 
In addition to the growing realization that 
the demise of the SDF was only a remote legal 
and political possibility, there were other con-
siderations pushing the socialists and pacifists 
in the direction of civilian control in 1980. 
These factors were both international and 
domestic. 
Internationally, the credibility of the Ameri-
can defense commitment to Japan was in-
creasingly questioned by the public, as was 
shown in public opinion polls. The announce-
ment of the Nixon doctrine, the U.S. military 
withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1973, fol-
lowed by the collapse of South Vietnam in 
1975, suggested that the United States was in 
the course of pulling out of Asia. This im-
pression was heightened by President's Car-
ter's announced policy of withdrawing Ameri-
can Forces from South Korea. The matter of 
Japan's defense could no longer be dismissed 
as a purely American problem. In the late 
1970's, the movement led by former Prime 
Minister Kishi Nobusuke aimed at amending 
Article 9 to permit rearmament was gaining 
support.36 
In 1979, the Soviet Union greatly 
strengthened its military bases in the northern 
islands which it had occupied at the end of the 
war and which Japan claimed as rightfully 
hers. The arrest and conviction of three SDF 
officers for passing military secrets to Soviet 
intelligence in early 1980 enhanced the view 
that the Soviet Union was no friend of Japan. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a 
shock to the peace-loving countries of the 
world, including Japan. Some Japanese, how-
ever, were almost as frightened by the Ameri-
can reaction against the Soviet as by the Soviet 
invasion. They hoped that President Carter 
would not 'revive the Cold War' in response to 
the Afghanistan affair. Regardless of whether 
or not one agreed with the American reaction, 
including the Olympics boycott, the sense of 
international crisis, which endangered the 
peace and security of Japan, was in the air. 
Books and magazine articles on World War III 
proliferated, and a debate between Professors 
Morishima Michio and Seki Y oshihiko on what 
Japan should do in the event of a Russian 
invasion raged for several months in journals 
read by the intellectuals and middle class.37 
Such a debate would have been almost un-
thinkable in the 1960's and early 1970's, when 
intellectuals overwhelmingly favored unarmed 
neutrality as Japan's foreign policy. 
The domestic political picture has also 
tended to favor a resolution of the dilemma 
concerning constitutional disarmament versus 
civilian control. The gradual decline of the 
governing Liberal Democratic Party has meant 
that it could usually win at best only a paper-
thin majority of seats in either house. The 
strong possibility that the LOP might lose its 
parliamentary majority encouraged the Japan 
Socialist Party to make plans for establishing a 
Socialist-led coalition government. However, 
in 1980, as the opportunity for forming a left 
or left-center coalition cabinet became more 
imminent, the disputes arr.ong the opposition 
parties were not being satisfactorily resolved. 
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Most notable were the incompatibilities be-
tween the Democratic Socialists (DSP) and the 
Japan Communists (JCP). The DSP doubted 
whether the JSP was really committed to the 
democratic system of government and 
threatened not to participate in any coalition 
with the JCP. The JCP regarded the DSP as a 
conservative party that had sold out the in-
terests of the proletariat. Late in 1979 and early 
1980, the JSP, DSP, and Komeito (affiliated 
with the Buddhist Soka Gakkai) made agree-
ments to form a coalition regime that would 
exclude the Communists. To organize a 
cooperative campaign in the elections held in 
the summer of 1980, the three parties making 
up the potential coalition tried to reconcile their 
differences on security issues, most impor-
tantly the Self-Defense Forces and the security 
treaty with the United States. This meant that 
the adamant Socialist opposition to setting up 
machinery for civilian control softened to ac-
cord better with the moderate stands of the 
Komeito and DSP. 
Thus a dramatic break-through occurred in 
February, 1980. The Japan Socialists agreed to 
participate in a special committee on national 
security in the House of Representatives. The 
new committee began its work almost im-
mediately, providing an official public forum 
for the discussion of strategic problems. 
The landslide victory of the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party in the upper and lower house 
elections held simultaneously in June, 1980, 
seemed to suggest strongly that the policy of 
'unarmed neutrality' advocated by the Socialist 
Party for thirty years had very little appeal to 
most Japanese and that the government's 
policy of cautious rearmament under civilian 
control enjoyed growing popular support. 
The Japanese government asserts that 'the 
SDF is under strict civilian control as in other 
democratic nations. This is entirely different 
from the system under the previous ( 1889) 
Japanese Constitution'. 38 
On the other hand, Samuel Huntington, 
writing in 1964, is pessimistic about establish-
ing civilian control in postwar Japan. He says 
that, although Japan's contemporary ideology 
is strongly pacifist, it is, like the prewar belli-
cose nationalism, hostile to military profes-
sionalism. The absence of a professional milit-
ary tradition and the influence of American 
ideas and practices are likely to complicate 
further the achievement of objective civilian 
control. Huntington says that 'the odds would 
appear to favor the emergence in Japan of a 
system of civil-military relations differing in 
appearance but not in essentials from that 
which prevailed prior to 1945.'39 
Professor James Buck, commenting on 
Huntington's projection, writes, 'To date there 
is no evidence to suggest this state of affairs 
will come to pass. On the other hand, given 
Japan's history, it is probably unwise to judge 
prematurely. '40 
In the meantime, the Japanese Supreme 
Court has not yet made its decision on the 
Naganuma case. Until it does, the constitution-
ality of the Self-Defense Forces remains in 
doubt. The thirty-year controversy over the 
interpretation of constitutional disarmament 
and civilian control in Japan has become en-
meshed with the definition of the scope of 
judicial review and the nature of 'political 
questions'. 
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Postscript 
Since the accompanying article was written, in November, 1982, 
Mr. Nakasone Yasuhiro became prime minister of Japan and in Jan-
uary 1983 he visited the United States and assured President Reagan 
that Japan would increase its defense efforts. Mr. Nakasone had 
been an active member of the Commission on the Constitution cre-
ated by the Japanese Diet to examine the origins, operation, and pos-
sible revision of the postwar Japanese Constitution. The 
Commission was engaged in its investigation from 1957 until 1964, 
when it published its comprehensive final report. Nakasone was es-
pecially conscious of the origins and interpretations of the Ashida 
amendment and holds that the Constitution permits Japan "to main-
tain the minimum necessary defensive power." (See Nakasone's ar-
ticle on Japan's comprehensive security in English translation in 
Japan Echo, Vol. V, No. 4 [Winter 1978], originally appearing in 
Seiron, September, 1978.) 
Nakasone, long the leader of a major faction of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, served as director general of the Defense Agency 
(i.e., Minister of Defense) in the Sato Cabinet from January 1970 to 
July 1971. It was in November 1970 that the famous author 
Mishima Yukio unsuccessfully appealed to members of the Self-De-
fense forces in Tokyo to carry out a coup d'etat and bring about the 
repeal of the disarmament clause of the Constitution. Mishima then 
committed harakiri. Although Mishima was regarded as an eccen-
tric with no substantial political following in Japan, his suicide stim-
ulated a serious discussion of Japan's defense posture. 
Nakasone has advocated the amendment of the Constitution to 
clarify the legality of the SDF and has advocated an increase in de-
fense expenditures. However, it is not expected that he will actively 
press for constitutional revision or for huge military increases, given 
the continuing popularity of Article 9 and the government's fiscal 
problems. 
On the origins of Article 9 see my "General Douglas MacAr-
thur and the Constitutional Disarmament of Japan," in the Transac-
tions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Third Series, Vol. XVII, Tokyo, 
1982, pp. 1-33. This paper is supplemented in the same issue with an 
extended commentary by Charles L. Kades, the principal drafter of 
Article 9 in MacArthur's headquarters. 
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